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Talk of levels is everywhere in cognitive science. Whether it is 
in terms of adjudicating longstanding debates or motivating 
foundational concepts, one cannot go far without hearing 
about the need to talk at different ‘levels’. Yet in spite of its 
widespread application and use, the concept of levels has 
received little sustained attention within cognitive science. 
This paper provides an analysis of the various ways the notion 
of levels has been deployed within cognitive science. The 
paper begins by introducing and motivating discussion via 
four representative accounts of levels. It then turns to outlining 
and relating the four accounts using two dimensions of 
comparison. The result is the creation of a conceptual 
framework that maps the logical space of levels talk, which 
offers an important step toward making sense of levels talk 
within cognitive science 
Keywords: levels; analysis; explanation; organization; 
cognitive science; conceptual framework 
Introduction 
 
Levels are everywhere in cognitive science. One cannot 
go far without hearing about the need to talk at different 
levels, whether it is in terms of levels of organization, 
explanation, description or aggregation. Levels have been 
called upon to do everything from adjudicate longstanding 
debates in cognitive modeling  (Broadbent, 1985; Dawson, 
1998) to motivating computational theories of mind 
(Pylyshyn, 1984).  
Yet in spite of its widespread application and use, the 
concept of levels has received little sustained attention in 
cognitive science. Although there has been excellent wider 
discussion in the philosophical literature about levels (see, 
e.g., Wimsatt, 1976; 1994), little has been done to develop 
the notion specifically within cognitive science – for early 
attempts see Bechtel (1994) and McClamrock (1991). As 
Wright and Bechtel (2007) point out: “levels-talk is virtually 
threadbare from overuse yet [the] various conceptions of 
levels are rarely analyzed in any sustained, substantive 
detail despite there being a litany of literature on the 
subject” (p.55). Or, as Craver puts it: “Despite the ubiquity 
of levels talk in contemporary science and philosophy, very 
little has been done to clarify the notion” (2015, p.23).  
This state of affairs calls out for improvement. In what 
follows, we aim to provide an analysis of the various ways 
levels have been deployed within cognitive science. The 
paper begins by introducing and motivating discussion via 
four representative accounts of levels. It then turns to 
outlining and relating the four accounts using two 
dimensions of comparison. The result is the creation of a 
conceptual framework that maps the logical space of levels 
talk. This conceptual framework offers one important step 
toward making sense of levels within cognitive science. 
Talking Levels 
 
The first account to consider is David Marr’s (1977, 
1982). Marr identifies three different “levels of analysis” for 
cognitive science.  
First, there is the computational level. At the 
computational level, investigators look at what function a 
system performs, asking questions about what information-
processing problem the system solves. Research at the 
computational level aims to translate general, everyday 
descriptions of cognitive phenomena into particular 
information-processing problems or tasks. Second, there is 
the algorithmic level. At the algorithmic level, researchers 
investigate by what steps a system solves an information-
processing problem; they ask questions about the algorithms 
and representations used by the system. Research at this 
level attempts to specify in detail the set of information-
processing procedures that solve a particular information-
processing problem. Finally, there is the implementational 
level. At the implementational level, researchers attempt to 
determine what physical structures instantiate the algorithms 
used for solving the information-processing problem; what 
physical mechanisms realize or support the cognitive system 
under investigation. 
For example, when investigators emphasize the 
spatiotemporal properties of cognitive systems using the 
techniques of neuroscience, such as neuroimaging or lesion 
studies, they operate at an implementational level. When 
investigators focus on how components interact so as to 
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produce the operations or procedures that carry out 
computations using the methods and techniques of cognitive 
psychology such as randomized block designs or error rates, 
they ascend to a higher, algorithmic level of analysis. Each 
level of analysis has a different role to play in the cognitive 
investigation, as each satisfies a different epistemic end. 
The second account to consider is Zenon Pylyshyn’s. 
Pylyshyn (1980, 1984) similarly identifies three “levels of 
description” for cognitive science, though where Marr is 
concerned with offering a unifying methodology for 
cognitive investigation Pylyshyn is concerned with 
articulating the foundations of cognitive science. 
First, there is what Pylyshyn identifies as the “semantic” 
level. At this level, psychological behaviour is described 
and explained using the representational or semantic content 
of an individual’s mental states; what the individual 
believes, desires, etc. Second, there is the “symbolic or 
syntactic” level. Behaviour at the symbolic level is 
described in terms of functional properties. For example, to 
explain why an individual does poorly on a memory-recall 
task, the symbolic level appeals to control structures or 
memory storage capacities. This is in contrast to explaining 
performance by referencing what information the individual 
fails to recall, for example. Third, there is the “biological 
level”. At the biological level, individuals are described in 
terms of the familiar vocabulary of the physical sciences, 
e.g., neurology, chemistry, biology. To account for why 
someone is thinking of faces rather than sounds, for 
example, explanations at the biological level might appeal 
to differences in brain activity or neural-chemistry. 
Similar to Marr, Pylyshyn (1980, 1984) is also 
impressed by the explanatory power of levels. However, 
whereas Marr’s levels are concerned with answering 
different types of questions, Pylyshyn’s levels are focused 
on capturing distinct generalizations. For Pylyshyn, 
different descriptive vocabularies capture distinct sets of 
regularities. He writes, for instance: “When we have 
principles of operation that cannot be stated within a certain 
vocabulary – but can be captured in another, more abstract 
(here, functional) vocabulary to which the terms of the first 
vocabulary stand in multiple relations – we have a prima 
facie case for the existence of an independent level” (1984, 
p.33). Some valid generalizations are only expressible at 
particular levels of description. 
Newell (1980, 1990) offers a third account. Newell 
defines what he calls “systems levels”. System levels are 
collections of components that, in virtue of their 
organization and interaction, produce particular functions or 
behaviours. System levels mark functional divisions 
between different sets of organized components. They 
define the basic “technology” by which the human cognitive 
architecture is constructed. Each system level is realized by 
components at the next system level below.  
Furthermore, since complicated systems are more likely 
to be resistant to degradation if they are built out of 
assemblies of stable subcomponents, it is more likely that 
system levels will be successively layered. As Newell puts 
it: “If stable subassemblies are created, layer upon layer, 
then each one has a reasonable probability of being 
constructed out of a few parts. Thus, there exists a general 
argument that stability dictates the existence of levels” 
(1990, p.117).  
In terms of identifying system levels, Newell claims that 
as one ascends upward from the smallest components to the 
largest components, system levels are revealed by their 
unique time signatures; as one moves up the hierarchy of 
system levels the size of each level will increase while 
speed will decrease. This follows in virtue of the 
aggregative size of levels. If components of one system 
level are of a characteristic size and those components are 
put together to form components at the next system level 
above, then it follows that the higher-level components will 
take longer to operate than their constitutive elements. 
Methodologically, the implication is that the time 
required to perform different tasks exposes different system 
levels. Different system levels are composed of increasingly 
larger components that operate at successively slower 
speeds. Qualitative shifts in time signatures reflect 
substantive shifts between different system levels. 
The final account to consider is William Bechtel’s 
(1994, 2007). Bechtel’s use of levels is a bit different from 
the preceding three, as it is formed within a larger 
discussion of mechanistic explanation. An explanation 
qualifies as mechanistic when it identifies a hierarchical 
system whose components, in virtue of their organization, 
produce some activity or behaviour. The goal of 
mechanistic explanation is to decompose a given 
mechanism, and its constitutive activities, into its 
underlying component parts, showing how those 
components conspire to produce the activity of the 
composite whole (see, e.g., Bechtel & Richardson, 1993; 
Craver, 2007). Rather than viewing levels as substantive 
divisions between different systems (as Newell does, for 
example), Bechtel prefers to view levels as local fields of 
analysis. Levels pick out the various explanatory strategies 
that can be used during mechanistic decomposition. As 
Bechtel writes: “[m]ultiple cycles of analysis thus give rise 
to a hierarchy of levels that is confined to a given 
mechanism” (2007, p.56). 
Bechtel (2007) offers the following example. Suppose a 
biological mechanism involves sodium molecules crossing 
over a cell membrane. On the mechanistic account, the 
sodium molecules and cell membrane can be said to be at 
the same level if both are implicated in the operation of the 
biological mechanism in question. The status of standing at 
higher or lower level depends, in part, on the explanatory 
role occupied by the component within the larger 
investigation – in contrast to, for example, slotting into a 
global organization of size, shape or motion. If the 
investigator pursues another cycle of decomposition, the 
components might be further decomposed, but this will still 
be local to the analysis being offered.  
On Bechtel’s analysis, it is not to possible to say that one 
mechanism exists at a higher or lower level than another. 
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There is no a global ordering available for mechanisms. 
Levels simply define the various explanatory strategies 
employed at any one cycle of decomposition. The existence 
of levels is mechanism dependent. As Bechtel puts it: 
“[L]evels on the mechanistic account are real in that they 
deal with the particularities of actual components and their 
operations, but they are perspectival in that they are defined 
with respect to specific foci on mechanistic activities 
(Wright & Bechtel, 2007, p.57). 
These four accounts should provide a flavor of the kind 
of levels talk that has prevailed in much of cognitive 
science. As one can see, the range is quite large. Just what a 
level is, how it is to be used, and why such talk is important 
varies notably from author to author. The question to 
address is how to make sense of these various uses of levels. 
Analyzing Levels 
 
There are two general points of comparison or 
dimensions of analysis that can be used to examine levels 
talk. The first deals with the types of items that figure into 
an account of levels; what ‘relata’ the view implicates. The 
second deals with how an account uses levels talk; to what 
end or purpose an account deploys levels. Consider each in 
turn.  
First, there seem to be two general types of relata used in 
levels talk. The first is ontic relata. On this view, levels talk 
is taken to hold of activities, structures, and properties. It 
applies to cognitive entities as they appear in the world. 
Newell offers something like this application with his 
system levels account: “[A] system level is a property of 
nature, and not just something in the head of the observer” 
(1990, p.118). On the ontic application, levels are part of the 
configuration of the world, picking out the various features 
constitutive of cognition.  
The second type of relata is epistemic relata. On this 
view, levels talk is taken to hold of ‘linguistic’ or 
‘theoretical’ entities. Marr is reasonably interpreted as 
subscribing to something like this view. When applied to 
epistemic relata, levels talk functions to provide 
perspectives for understanding cognition. It offers a means 
of enhancing an investigator’s epistemic situation.  
When viewed as extremes, these two general 
applications form a continuum on which various accounts 
can be located. Figure 1 provides an illustration. 




Epistemic vs. Ontic  
 
Figure 1: Levels accounts arranged along a spectrum 
of commitment to epistemic vs. ontic relata. 
 
On the one hand, there are those views such as Marr’s that 
apply levels talk to epistemic relata. On the other hand, 
there are also those views such as Newell’s that apply levels 
talk to ontic relata. An account’s positioning depends on the 
relata it implicates. 
Notice that Bechtel’s view provides something of an 
interesting middle ground, as it straddles the two poles. On 
Bechtel’s view, levels of mechanisms are both ontic 
structures and observer-dependent entities. Mechanistic 
activities are real phenomenon in the world, but their 
arrangement into different levels depends on the 
explanatory goals of the investigation.  
An additional implication of applying levels talk to 
epistemic versus ontic relata is that it changes how levels 
relate within a given account. If, on the one hand, an 
account applies to ontic relata, then its levels relate via a 
metaphysical realization relation. If, on the other hand, the 
account applies to explanatory or theoretical entities, then 
its levels relate in virtue of an explanatory realization 
relation.   
Metaphysical realization is the familiar notion from 
philosophy of mind that says that two entities stand in a 
realization relation if and only if when there is change in the 
higher-level entity there is a corresponding change in the 
underlying entity change, but not the reverse (Kim, 1998). 
The standard example is the relation between mental and 
physical states. Since there cannot be change among mental 
states without a corresponding change among physical 
states, physical states are said to realize mental states. 
Metaphysical realization involves a determinative, 
asymmetric dependence relation between different 
properties, states or activities.  
Explanatory realization, on the other hand, has received a 
little less attention than its ontological cousin. In 
explanatory realization, the dependence relation tracks items 
of particular theories, languages, or models. It addresses 
explanatory rather than metaphysical entities. The 
realization relation holds between statements rather than 
entities. 
An illustrative example comes from theory reduction in 
the philosophy of science. On the standard model of theory 
reduction, one theory reduces to a second if and only if the 
first theory is derivable from the second given certain 
“bridge laws” (Nagel, 1961). Reduction occurs when all of 
the items of one theory can be translated into items of the 
second theory via specific law-like statements or logical 
connectives. For example, the theory of thermal 
conductivity reduces to electrical conductivity because 
(most) of the terms in thermal conductivity can be translated 
into terms of electrical conductivity via covering 
generalizations such as the Wiedemann-Franz Law.  
Whether or not the reduction is successful is beside the 
point. The point to note is that the supportive relation holds 
between different theories or linguistic items and not 
ontological structures. Explanatory realization shifts 
attention to how descriptions of entities within theories 
sustain or determine the theoretical fruitfulness of entities 
described at other levels.  
On the epistemic application, hierarchies of levels stand 
in similar sorts of explanatory realization relations. This is 
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why both Pylyshyn and Marr emphasis the collective use of 
several levels. On Marr’s account, for example, the 
computational level identifies a given input-output mapping, 
while the algorithmic level describes the procedures by 
which the function is computed. The algorithmic level 
supplies crucial constraints on satisfying the input-output 
mapping. The algorithmic level makes it possible for the 
computational level to track real computations in the world. 
Second, different accounts of levels can also be measured 
to the extent to which they use levels talk for epistemic 
versus ontic or metaphysical purposes. 
On the ontic usage, levels talk attempts to provide 
descriptions of how cognition is organized. Levels talk is in 
the business of providing accurate descriptions of how the 
world is organized. Discussion attempts to furnish 
representative accounts of how cognitive systems and 
capacities are structured into levels.  
Consider Newell’s account, for example. On Newell’s 
view, different “cognitive bands” address different sets of 
“system levels” – for example, the biological band 
addresses the neural circuit system level, while the cognitive 
band deals with the deliberate act system level. On Newell’s 
view, levels talk functions to describe the organization and 
structure of cognition as described by the different system 
levels. Thus, according to the ontic usage, levels talk has a 
distinctly ontic role to play in discussion of cognition.  
Contrast this position with a second, epistemic type of 
usage. On this usage, levels talk deals with how cognitive 
phenomena should be studied. Levels function to provide 
perspectives or viewpoints from which to investigate 
cognition. As Dawson puts it: “levels do not attempt to 
explain the nature of information processing devices, but 
instead provide an epistemology – a way to inquire about 
the nature of the world” (2013, p.53). Levels talk acts as a 
tool for inquiry rather than as an ontic description of 
cognition. 
Consider Marr’s account, for example. On Marr’s view, 
the computational, algorithmic and implementational levels 
help to organize cognitive investigation into its most 
explanatory fruitful parts. The computational level deals 
with function of the cognitive system, the algorithmic level 
deals with the procedures used to carry out said function, 
and the implementational level deals with physical material 
in which the computation is instantiated. Each level 
partitions investigation into distinct units of analysis such 
that it structures and simplifies discussion. 
When viewed as extremes, these two general usages form 
a second continuum on which various accounts can be 
located. Figure 2 provides an illustration. 
 




Epistemic vs. Ontic Usage 
 
Figure 2: Levels accounts arranged along a spectrum 
of commitment to explanatory versus ontic usage. 
On the one hand, there are those views such as Marr’s that 
deploy levels talk for explanatory purposes – these accounts 
view levels talk as a tool for inquiry. On the other hand, 
there are those views such as Newell and Pylyshyn’s that 
use levels talk for metaphysical or ontic purposes – these 
accounts view levels talk as a means to describe cognitive 
structures as they appear in the world. Different accounts 
employ levels talk to different ends.  
A Conceptual Framework for Levels 
 
The fact that levels talk can be sorted along two 
dimensions of analysis allows for the creation of a 
conceptual framework that can be used to the map the 
logical space of levels talk. Figure 3 provides an illustration. 
 
Figure 3: Levels views compared along commitment 
to ontic versus epistemic relata and usage. 
 
Marr’s account occupies the bottom left corner of the 
space. This is because it applies levels talk to exclusively 
theoretical or linguistic entities. Both the relata and usage 
are taken to be explanatory in nature. Marr’s account is 
followed by Pylyshyn and Bechtel’s accounts in the middle. 
These views tow a more neutral line, conceiving of levels as 
at once ontic and epistemic in character to some degree – 
Pylyshyn’s view, for example, applies to epistemic relata 
but is used to make claims about the leveled structure of 
cognition. Finally, there is Newell’s view in the top right 
hand corner of the space. Newell’s position here is owed to 
his adherence to almost entirely ontic application of levels 
talk – levels talk applies to ontic relata (system levels) and 
is used to describe the structure of cognitive architecture in 
terms of the system levels.  
What is interesting about this framework is that it maps 
many of the possible applications of levels talk. It is both 
descriptive and generative. Various accounts are positioned 
with respect to how they talk about levels, but at the same 
time the framework leaves it open as to how other accounts 
might use levels. 
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Now one might worry that the framework uses two 
dimensions of analysis where only one is necessary, 
particularly given that both points of comparison include an 
ontic versus epistemic element. The reason two dimensions 
are more effective than one is that two dimensions allow the 
current framework to distinguish positions, such as Bechtel 
or Pylyshyn’s, that deploy level talk both epistemically and 
ontically. Using only one dimension would fail effectively 
convey the difference between positions such as these, as 
Pylyshyn’s view implicates epistemic relata but makes ontic 
claims and Bechtel’s view implicates ontic relata but uses 
levels as an epistemic tool.  
One might further worry that the present analysis 
focuses too much on “first generation” cognitive science. 
That it does not pay sufficient attention to neurological or 
biological levels. Though this objection is well motivated, it 
is misplaced in present context. Nothing in the current 
analysis precludes discussion of neurological or biological 
levels. It is simply that neurological or biological levels 
have not featured prominently in discussion of levels – for 
discussion, see Craver (2015). Although it is certainly right 
to say that cognitive processes, states, and systems are 
abstract in the sense that they can be discussed without 
reference to material form but concrete in the sense that they 
are realized in a specific physical medium (Thagard, 2014), 
the current analysis is neutral with respect to the importance 
of this fact. The current analysis simply attempts to map the 
space of levels talk as it has been most prominently 
developed within cognitive science. Whether or not 
neurological levels are crucial to understanding cognition is 
of secondary concern to the present investigation. 
The framework also reveals three more general, 
orienting positions that might be held with respective to 
levels. The first is what might be called the “perspectivist or 
perspectival” view. On the perspectival view, levels talk 
applies to the products or units of scientific investigation. 
Levels deal with theories, explanations or research programs 
rather than ontic structures. Different epistemic structures 
are sorted according to the different questions they address. 
Items on the perspectival view relate in virtue of standing in 
explanatory rather than ontic relations – recall, for example, 
what was said about explanatory versus metaphysical 
realization. Included here are views such as Marr’s.  
The second is what might be called the “realist” view. 
According to this view, levels talk applies to items in the 
world. This means that levels deal with entities, activities 
and properties. These items exist as part of the furniture of 
cognition. These structures relate via compositional 
relations. Each item is constituted or realized by items 
residing at lower levels. Often, a principle of prediction or 
causality is used to sort items into different levels. Newell is 
included under this second heading.  
Finally, there is the “quasi-realist” view. On this view, 
levels talk applies to the components and activities of 
mechanisms. These are features of the world. However, in 
contrast to realism and closer to perspectivism, levels also 
have an epistemic bent. Though levels count as real parts of 
cognition, they only emerge during or as part of 
investigation. As Bechtel writes: “Constitutive strategies 
describe the mechanism’s component parts, their operations, 
and their organization, showing how the mechanism’s 
constituency is responsible for its activity” (2007, p.62). 
Levels are theoretical impositions, being explanatory 
strategies, but they are also part of the mechanisms 
constitutive of cognition. Bechtel falls under this third 
category. 
Note that these three views are probably best regarded as 
representative positions rather than actual positions 
individual authors’ hold. Each view represents a sort of 
general umbrella category or idealized position that can be 
used to explore different types of levels talk without getting 
into all the messiness of interpreting individual authors’ 
viewpoints.  
What is it about the realist, quasi-realist, and 
perspectivist positions that make other views cluster around 
them? One possibility is that the divisions reflect larger 
differences in overarching conceptions of cognition or 
science (see, e.g., van Fraassen, 1980). That the 
realism/anti-realism split reflects a larger divide that runs 
through most theoretical discussions in the sciences. 
Another possibility might be that the various views are just 
different sides of the same coin; that with additional work 
each can be distilled into one underlying view. For example, 
perhaps Marr’s more perspectivist view collapses into the 
realist view if it is cashed out in specifically causal terms. 
Or, perhaps the claims of the realist can be deflated and 
shown to be subsumable under the quasi-realist’s account. 
There are three desirable features to the present 
framework. First, it helps to clarify confusions between 
different accounts of levels. For example, in their review of 
Marr’s tripartite account of levels, Churchland, Koch, and 
Sejnowski write: “when we measure Marr’s three levels of 
analysis against levels of organization in the nervous 
system, the fit is poor and confusing” (1990, p.38). For 
Churchland, Koch and Sejnowski, Marr’s levels are either 
inadequate or patently false. They fail to offer accurate 
characterizations of the organization of cognition as it 
realized in the brain. Since there are a great many spatial 
levels of organization in the brain, Marr’s levels makes for a 
poor fit.  
Understood within the context of the present analysis, 
the issue is immediately clear: Churchland, Koch and 
Sejnowski have mistaken the relata of Marr’s account. 
Marr’s levels are not a poor fit for brain organization, 
because they are not meant to fit with brain organization. 
Churchland, Koch and Sejnowski have confused Marr’s 
epistemological application of levels talk with an 
ontological one. In cases such as these, knowing what 
elements to look for can help identify key areas where 
potential misunderstandings might arise. The framework 
can play a therapeutic role in discussion. 
Second, the conceptual framework furnishes 
interpretative benefits. This is because it allows the 
underlying reasoning of each account to be more easily 
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understood. For example, on Newell’s view, evolution is 
thought to favor systems constructed through addition of 
modular parts, since it is more likely that nature will build 
complex systems incrementally rather than all at once. 
Understood in realist terms, this reasoning makes sense. 
Attention to the spatial and temporal features of levels weds 
naturally to a focus on evolutionary considerations. Once it 
is clear at what end each account aims, the underlying 
reasoning is more easily explicated. 
Third, in the case of more substantive disagreements 
over levels, the framework helps to clarify different lines of 
support, and thus chart potential argumentative paths 
through the levels space. For example, returning to Newell’s 
account, if one is dubious of the appeal to evolution on the 
grounds that such arguments are underdetermined, then one 
can argue that the realist position is importantly under-
motivated; that application of levels talk to cognitive 
structures is too quick. Or, to take the contrary position, if 
one is concerned that the perspectival view relegates levels 
talk to an arbitrary status, then the current analysis provides 
a direction in which to mount this challenge – for example, 
that it fails to get at the real structures and organization of 
cognition. The framework helps to simply discussion by 
cutting to the core elements of disagreement.  
For all these reasons, the present framework offers an 
important tool for cognitive science. It provides a means to 
thinking about and sorting through various types of levels 
talk. It also reveals key elements of the various accounts 
while staying neutral with respect to alternative ways of 
applying levels talk.  
In closing, a quick qualification needs to be made. The 
preceding analysis is not meant to be the definitive guide to 
conceptualizing levels. It is entirely possible that other 
dimensions of analysis exist on which applications of levels 
talk can be analyzed. However, the present account does 
identify several important features that cut across a large 
swath of levels talk. What the present discussion has 
provided, we hope, is one concrete step toward making of 
further sense of levels in cognitive science. 
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